We Can’t Stop a Russian Tanker in the Channel. What Chance Do We Have in Space?

When an oil tanker moved through the English Channel, its signal erratic and its ownership concealed, it was clear it belonged to Russia's shadow fleet.

Despite the name, it was very much visible. Officials, insurers, and commercial trackers knew what it was and where it was bound. Yet it passed through one of the most watched waterways in the world without incident. Why?

Because awareness isn't the issue. What counts is the ability to act. Stopping such a vessel is rarely straightforward: it raises questions of jurisdiction, invites military or diplomatic risk, and requires ministers to make decisive calls and stand by them. 

Too often, that resolve is absent or slow to come. So the ship sails on while the state hesitates.

Britain now faces the same problem in space.

The UK and its allies have become much better at tracking objects in orbit. Commercial companies monitor debris, satellites, and unusual maneuvers at scale. British capabilities have improved, often with allied support. But better visibility does not by itself bring security.

This matters because our dependence on satellites is considerable. Around 20 percent of UK GDP relies on satellite-enabled services. Global Navigation Satellite Systems support navigation, banking, communications, weather forecasting, and the power grid. 

The National Timing Centre program was established partly out of concern over this exposure. Government estimates suggest a serious loss of timing signals could cost the economy around 1 billion pounds ($1.4 billion) a day. 

The armed forces are equally reliant. If these systems fail, civilian life and military operations suffer together.

We've already seen what disruption looks like. Russian forces have repeatedly jammed GPS near the front line, forcing Ukrainian units onto alternative systems and, at times, paper maps. 

Precision weapons have lost accuracy in heavily jammed areas, and with navigation affected, movement has slowed and coordination has become harder.

Jamming is only part of the picture. Russia and China have both launched satellites that maneuver close to others, raising concerns about inspection and interference. 

In 2021, Russia destroyed one of its own satellites in a missile test, generating more than 1,500 trackable debris fragments and forcing astronauts on the International Space Station to take shelter.

According to the Secure World Foundation, at least 13 countries are now developing counterspace capabilities across a range of methods.

Much of this activity stays below the threshold of open conflict. A country can present it as routine behavior, slowing the case for a clear or immediate response. Delay works in the aggressor's favor. Ambiguity is a weapon in itself.

This is why the Channel analogy holds. At sea or in orbit, we may know what the problem is and still fail to address it. But in space, the stakes are higher and the timeline far shorter. 

A delay at sea may embarrass a government, but a delay in orbit may cripple services used by millions: when something goes wrong in orbit, the effects can cascade across many systems at once.

Britain needs to change how it approaches space resilience. It should rely less on a small number of costly satellites that present obvious targets, and spread capability across larger constellations of smaller systems. 

Losing one asset should not cripple the whole network. Resilience must be designed in from the start, not retrofitted under pressure.

London also needs spacecraft that can function when ground links are jammed or severed. That means systems able to detect interference, adjust course, and continue operating with less human control.

This is already happening in parts of the commercial sector, where scale demands it. Defense should learn from them. Control that depends on perfect communications is weak control.

The tanker in the Channel exposed the limits of enforcement, not awareness. Space will expose those limits far more harshly if Britain doesn't adapt.

The UK is improving its ability to watch events in orbit. It must now improve its ability to act. Seeing the problem is only the first step.

Graeme Ritchie is CEO and co-founder of Shield Space.

Graeme spent over two decades in special forces and operational command before leading MoD programmes in autonomy, counter-UAS, and Defence Space.

He now runs Shield Space, a UK defence tech company developing control and counterspace capabilities for NATO and its allies.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

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